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Abstract 
As part of the monetary transmission studies of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, this paper 
attempts to analyse the role of the housing market in the monetary transmission 
mechanism of Hungary. The housing market can influence monetary transmission 
through three channels, namely, the nature of the interest burden of mortgage loans, 
asset (house) prices, and the credit channel. The study first summarises the experiences 
of developed countries, paying special attention to issues arising from the monetary 
union. It then examines the developments in the Hungarian housing and mortgage 
markets in the last 15 years, as well as the expected developments and changes attendant 
to the adoption of the euro. Using panel econometric techniques, the study investigates 
the link between macroeconomic variables and house prices in Hungary, and the effect 
of monetary policy on housing investment and consumption through the wealth effect 
and house equity withdrawal.  
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I. Introduction 
Housing may be considered mundane, an ordinary part of a household’s everyday life.  
However, it can also be a rather complex economic phenomenon, as dwellings can have 
several functions. Apart from being the traditional ‘roof over one’s head’, a house can 
serve as a source of wealth accumulation, a valuable item for bequest motives, or a form 
of investment. Another distinctive characteristic of housing is its sizeable share in 
household wealth, implying its importance in the household’s decision-making process. 
As a result, shocks to the housing market can have a significant impact on household 
behaviour, and on the economy as a whole.   
The housing market is more complex than the consumption goods market in a number 
of ways. Not only are the standard economic agents present; other institutions, such as 
mortgage markets and governmental subsidy/tax regimes, also play a role. Due to the 
complex interactions among these agents, it is important for policymakers to understand 
the mechanisms that drive housing market dynamics.  
Taking note of the aforementioned distinctive role of dwellings, we attempt to analyse 
the role of the housing market in the Hungarian monetary transmission, as part of the 
monetary transmission studies of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Section II provides an 
overview of the theoretical background of transmission through the housing market. 
Section III provides stylised facts about the housing markets of developed countries and 
its implication for monetary policy. Section IV gives a brief description of the Hungarian 
housing market. Section V presents the empirical estimates, for Hungary, of  the effect of 
interest rates on the behaviour of the household sector and discusses the expected effects 
of the single monetary policy of the eurozone on the Hungarian markets. Finally, Section 
VI presents the conclusions.   
II. The theoretical foundations of transmission 
This section discusses the three main theoretical channels through which the housing 
market and related economic forces influence the behaviour of households: (1) the 
interest rate channel; (2) the asset price and wealth effect; and (3) the credit channel.  The 
interest rate channel is important in that the changing mortgage interest rate alters the 
amount of monthly repayment, thereby influencing households’ disposable income.  As 
regards the asset price and wealth effect, dwellings may be considered as an asset class; 
thus, their prices and investment volume can be determined like that of any other asset. 
Moreover, a rise in house prices implies increasing wealth, which makes higher 
consumption possible through the wealth effect. Finally, the credit channel has a fairly 
similar effect: a rise in house prices increases housing wealth and, consequently, the 
available collateral for the loan, which, in turn, induces higher consumption expenditure. 
II. 1. Interest rate channel 
Monetary policy can have a direct impact on the behaviour of households through the 
interest rates on mortgage loans, providing a significant channel of monetary 
transmission. There are three main characteristics of mortgage loans that are relevant for 
monetary transmission. The most important characteristic is the low risk of a mortgage 
loan, which is reflected in the low risk premium. The physical characteristics of the 
dwellings, serving as collaterals, explain the low level of risk: dwellings are immobile and 
have a very long lifetime. The second characteristic is related to the size of the loans. 
Usually the mortgage loan is the largest loan in the portfolio of a household, representing 
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a high ratio both compared to the value of the house and to disposable income. The 
third characteristic is long maturity which, on the one hand, is feasible due to the safety 
of the collateral but which, on the other hand, requires a long amortisation period due to 
the large volume of debt. 
Despite the low level of risk, financial intermediaries have nevertheless set up prudential 
limits on mortgage loans. Due to the volatility of house prices and the costs related to 
liquidating the dwelling of non-servicing debtors, limits were introduced to maximise the 
loan-to-value ratios. For the monetary transmission, however, another limit is of greater 
interest: the one determining the ratio of monthly instalments to disposable income. As a 
general rule, monthly instalments should not exceed one-third of disposable monthly 
income.   
The nominal interest rate on a mortgage loan can be broken down into three 
components: inflation compensation, risk-free real interest rate, and the risk premium of 
mortgage loans. For debtor households, the real interest rate prevailing in the economy 
and the risk premium are equally relevant; together they determine the real cost of a 
mortgage loan. Inflation compensation also has an impact on the behaviour of the 
households. In other words, for the households it is not simply the net present value of 
the cash flow that is important, but also the duration of the loan.   
If the nominal interest rate is high due to high inflation, then the ratio of inflation 
compensation would be increasing within the monthly instalment and, ceteris paribus, 
the ratio of capital amortisation would be decreasing. This implies that, in case of higher 
inflation, higher nominal monthly instalments are required to serve a mortgage loan with 
the same net present value. Monetary policy has to take into consideration that, with the 
increase in nominal interest rates, more and more households would face a credit 
constraint due to the amortisation/income ratio. 
Figure 1, taking the example of a 20-year loan with fixed nominal instalments and a 1/3 
amortisation/income ratio, shows the maximum amount of loan, expressed in terms of 
monthly income, as a function of the nominal interest rate. In case of a 19% interest rate, 
the maximum loan is less than two years’ income, roughly one third of what is available 
at a 3% nominal interest rate. 
So far we have argued that the nominal interest rate is important due to its impact on 
credit constraints.  However, the indexation of monthly instalments could also result in 
higher loan amounts, as it allows monthly instalments to grow nearly parallel with 
monthly income. While indexation can be useful in the financial markets as long as the 
inflation uncertainty is not too high, it can easily have a counter-effect on long-run 
inflation. The more widespread indexation is in an economy, the more permanent 
inflationary inertia can turn out to be, making disinflation more costly in the future.  
In what follows, we group the different kinds of mortgage loans, according to the link 
between the key interest rate and mortgage rates. The long-maturity mortgage loans can 
be divided into two major sets based on whether mortgage rates are fixed or variable 
within the time horizon (2-3-years) relevant for monetary policy. 
The shorter the interest rate period of a loan, the stronger the effect of the key interest 
rate on the mortgage rate.  In case of variable rate mortgages, first, re-pricing occurs 
faster, and second, changes in the key interest rate have a stronger effect on short rates. 
Thus, variable rate mortgages provide a direct and efficient channel for monetary 
transmission. 
If, on the other hand, rates are fixed for longer periods (for instance, 5 years), then 
changes in the key interest rate would have only an indirect effect, in two stages.  The 
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first step involves the impact of changes in the key interest rate on the yield curve at 
maturities relevant for mortgage loans. It is important to note that, in general, the effect 
will be declining at longer maturities. The second step is related to the length of the 
period with a fixed rate. Market rates are relevant only at the beginning of a new interest 
rate period.  Thus, while having an immediate impact on new loans, they exert only a 
gradual effect on the outstanding stock of existing loans.  
Another feature that should be considered in the case of fixed loans is the possibility of 
early repayment. If debtors can refinance with low transaction costs (having callable 
loans), then the transmission mechanism becomes asymmetric. During periods of 
declining interest rates, debtors will take advantage of lower rates, reducing monthly 
instalments and/or increasing the amount of the loan. This is an immediate reaction to 
lower rates. Increasing rates, on the other hand, do not imply any changes in the 
behaviour of households, as debtors keep servicing their loans with the original fixed 
rates. Monetary tightening has no immediate effect on household behaviour; its impact 
can be discerned only at the beginning of the new interest rate period, as discussed 
above.           
II. 2. Asset price and wealth effect 
In theory the price of an asset is the net present value of future dividends (D) that it can 
earn, that is, [ ]∑∞= += 10 )1(t tt rDEP . However, before we apply asset price theory to 
housing investment, we should re-examine the role of dwellings. 
In the microeconomic sense, a house is not simply a ‘roof over one’s head’. Arrondel and 
Lefebvre (2001) define the dual aspect of the households’ housing decision-making 
process: as a source of housing services and as an asset, i.e., housing is also taken into 
consideration in investment decisions. Xiao Di (2001) examines the role of dwellings in 
the USA, where housing investment is treated as a form of investment, at par with 
financial investment.  
By and large, although housing investment has several special characteristics (e.g., a 
considerable amount of initial down-payment, large transaction costs, uncertainty about 
quality, uniqueness of every unit, relative illiquidity, long implementation time, etc.), it 
can be regarded as an investment form. The owner of a house can realise income from 
tenants and from changes in house prices. Increasing house prices can provide a higher 
return on real estate than does financial investment, and thus force households to 
reallocate their portfolios. In general, households are willing to buy or sell assets as long 
as they are profitable, irrespective of the type of the asset in question. 
The determinants of house prices are examined in empirical literature as well (for 
instance, see Cho (1996), Mayer and Somerwille (1996)). Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) 
introduced the following equation for house prices: 
 
,...),/,,,/( MPPryPOPHgPt ∆=  (1) 
 
where H, POP , y, r and M denote demand for housing, population, average real income, 
interest rate, and a proxy for credit/mortgage rationing, respectively. Two points are 
worthy of note. First, Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) show a fairly stable house price-to- 
income ratio. Second, recall that return on housing investment (R) equals [ ] [ ] ttt PPEDER )( 11 ++ ∆+=  in asset price theory, which suggests that this return could 
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be related to returns from any other investment form. Chen and Patel (1998) made this 
explicit by using the form  
[ ] ttttt DVprEyp δγβα 11 +∆−++= ++  (2) 
 
where DV and the small letters denote demographic variables and the logarithm of the 
corresponding variables, respectively. It should be noted that equation (2) can be 
considered as the long-term component of the error correction model. The Bank of 
England (2000) (hereafter BoE) model uses a similar form in the long-run house price 
equation,  restricting the long-run elasticity of income to one. 
At first glance, it would appear that these empirical shortcuts have no connection with 
asset price theory.  However, Vadas (2003) showed that if one considers housing as an 
asset, the theoretical price relation of the portfolio choice model can be captured by the 
error correction form. Based on the aforementioned considerations, we can examine the 
effect of the interest rate on house price by using the error correction form, keeping in 
mind the underlying asset price implications. 
Obviously, changing house prices influence households’ decisions, that is, those 
pertaining to housing investment and consumption. As far as dwelling investment is 
concerned, we can apply the portfolio choice approach described in Vadas (2003). This 
paper argues that the choice of investment between real and financial assets can be 
compared to the choice between two financial assets. Based on this, the ratio (τ) between 
dwelling investment and gross saving1 can be explained by the excess return (ER) of 
holding real estate over holding a financial asset2:  
 
[ ] tttt ERLL ετητ +Θ+Φ+−+= ))()((exp1
1  (3) 
 
Given τ , dwelling investment can be computed by multiplying τ by gross saving. 
In the case of consumption, the BoE model (2000) uses the modified version of the 
error correction consumption equation originally suggested by Hendry and Ungern 
Sternberg (1981). In the BoE model, households’ wealth consists not only of net 
financial but also housing wealth. When house prices rise, total housing wealth does so 
too, which implies a positive adjustment to consumption through the error correction 
mechanism. Case et al (2001) and Girouard and Blöndal (2001) also found an empirically 
significant positive relationship between housing wealth and household expenditure. 
Based on this, the consumption function can be formed the following way: 
 ( ) ttthtftttt ycwwycc εααβββαα +∆+∆+−−−+=∆ −−−−− 312121211110  (4) 
 
where c, wf and wh denote consumption expenditure, financial and housing wealth, 
respectively. 
                                                 
1 Gross saving equals households’ disposable income minus consumption expenditure. 
2 Since the ratio of housing investment to gross savings must be between 0 and 1, the study suggests the 
logistic function, which fulfills this requirement. 
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II. 3. Credit channel  
If mortgage repayment is tied to the value of the collateral, namely dwellings, changes in 
house prices alter the amount of monthly repayment by changing the risk premium. 
Increasing house prices reduce, while decreasing house prices increase, the risk premium. 
Thus, changes in house prices either increase or decrease the amount of monthly 
repayment, thereby influencing the ability to repay, and the possibility of default. 
Several theoretical and empirical studies seek to incorporate these effects into their 
models. Westaway (1992) provides a comprehensive general equilibrium model, which 
incorporates the flow of housing services into the utility function. Aoki et al. (2002) go 
one step further and not only use housing services in the utility function, but also apply 
the financial accelerator model developed by Bernanke et al. (2000).  The main point of 
the financial accelerator is that house prices influence housing wealth which households 
can use as collateral in borrowing. If house prices increase, housing wealth and available 
collateral do so as well. Consequently, households can borrow at a lower financial 
premium and/or increase their indebtedness. 
The financial accelerator can be captured in two ways in empirical modelling. First, the 
financial premium on households’ loans should be linked to housing wealth. Although 
this would be the better option, identifying the premium on the consumer loan can prove 
to be very difficult. The other method involves linking households’ consumption to 
housing wealth directly. However, in this case, the wealth effect and the financial 
accelerator or credit channel cannot be separated. Even so, we employ this latter 
approach in empirical investigation due to the measurement difficulty of the first 
approach. 
The following diagram summarizes the theoretical monetary transmission channels, 
discussed in this section. 
Diagram 1. Housing and mortgage markets in monetary transmission 
 
Key interest 
rate 
 Yield curve 
Asset price 
Mortgage loans  Assets available for 
collaterals 
Real interest 
rate 
Investment Consumption 
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III. International experiences of mortgage and real estate markets  
The first part of this section describes the main features of the housing and mortgage 
markets in a set of developed, mainly European, countries and then attempts to show the 
relevance of these structural factors in the monetary transmission mechanism. The 
second part deals with the assessment of housing related monetary transmission in the 
EU countries, focusing especially on the eurozone. 
III. 1. Housing markets in developed countries 
Mortgage regimes play an important role in determining the key indicators of housing 
markets in developed countries. All three theoretical types of mortgage regimes, 
described in Chapter II, can be found in developed countries. Most countries can be 
characterised by the dominance of a particular type that has, historically, become the 
most relevant. Grouping the countries according to mortgage regimes, the following 
table summarises the major characteristics of the housing and mortgage markets in a 
number of developed, mainly EU, countries. 
 
Table 1. Key mortgage and housing indicators in developed countries (2001) 
Countries Dominant type of mortgage Mortgage/GDP
Average 
LTV* 
Owner 
occupation 
Denmark 67% 80% 59% 
US 
Fixed callable 
58% 78% 68% 
Germany 47% 70% 39% 
Netherlands 74% 112% 53% 
France 22% 60% 58% 
Italy 
Fixed non-callable 
10% 55% 69% 
UK 60% 70% 68% 
Ireland 30% 60-70% 78% 
Portugal 47% 70-80% 64% 
Spain 
Variable 
32% 80% 85% 
* Loan-to-value 
Source: ECB, OECD 
 
The first observation that can be drawn from the table is that, despite their similarities in 
terms of recent macroeconomic framework (low inflation, co-ordinated and stability-
oriented economic policy), sound and liberalised financial systems, and a high standard of 
living, developed countries exhibit a surprisingly wide range of key mortgage and housing 
indicators.  
Analysing the countries individually, Denmark and the US belong to the first group, 
which can be labelled as fixed callable mortgage markets. These highly efficient and mature 
financial markets are able to provide mortgage loans that have fixed interest rates for up 
to 10-15 years and have the flexibility needed for the early repayment of long mortgage 
loans. It is not surprising that very few countries belong to this group. Both the US and 
Denmark have above-average owner-occupation rates, as well as very high 
mortgage/GDP ratios, indicating the significant role of mortgages in the economy.  
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The second group consists of countries where the majority of the mortgage loans have 
fixed interest rates, but early repayment is constrained by high fees. Most of the continental 
European countries belong to this category, which can be further split into two subsets. 
The first subset is represented by Germany and the Netherlands, with both countries 
having a high level of mortgage loans. The historical commitment of policymakers to 
price stability in these countries has created a favourable environment for high turnover 
at low and fixed long-term interest rates. In other aspects, however, the two countries 
have some extreme features: the ratio of owner occupation is the lowest in Germany 
among all the countries in our survey, while the Netherlands has surprisingly high loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios, on average exceeding 100% in the case of new mortgages3.  
In the second subset of countries with long fixed interest rates, the mortgage loans do 
not play an equally significant role in the economy. France and Italy belong to this group, 
with traditionally low mortgage debt/GDP ratios of 22% and 10%, respectively.  
The mortgage markets in the third set of countries are characterised by variable interest 
rates. The UK has been the most traditional example of variable-rate mortgages, with a 
high mortgage debt/GDP ratio (60%), close to those in the first group. Apart from the 
UK, the fast growing mortgage markets of Portugal and Spain are also dominated by 
variable rates. These eurozone members benefit from low interest rates, considering that, 
prior to the nominal convergence, the high interest rates generated credit constraints for 
the majority of households. In Portugal, the mortgage debt/GDP ratio was 47% in 2001, 
equal to that of Germany, whereas a decade earlier, it was comparable to that of Italy 
(12%).  
We have argued earlier at theoretical level that mortgage loans should constitute a big 
portion of households’ debt portfolio. This is indeed the case in most developed 
countries, as the ratio of mortgage debt/total household debt varies in the range of 0.4-
0.8. Empirically there is a relatively strong correlation between mortgage/GDP and 
mortgage/total household debt ratios. (see Figure 2) The higher the role of mortgage 
loans in an economy (mortgage/GDP), the higher its share in total indebtedness of 
households. It indicates that mortgage loans are key determinants of the level of 
households’ indebtedness in developed countries, while other loan types have less 
variability across countries.  
 
Evolution of the main indicators 
The financial deregulation of the 1980s may be considered as a good staring point in 
examining the dynamics of mortgage markets. In the overwhelming majority of the EU 
countries, the deregulation of the mortgage markets started in the ‘80s, proceeding at 
different speeds across countries. The major steps generally included the abolition of 
interest rate ceilings on mortgage contracts, as well as the elimination of credit controls 
and contractual restrictions. Further measures were taken with the aim of liberalising 
entry into mortgage markets and the securitisation of mortgage loans.  
In the short run, however, the quite similar deregulation measures did not lead to similar 
mortgage markets, but rather widened the set of available choices for new contracts in 
most countries. The primary reason why mortgage markets could keep their national 
characteristics for long was the very long maturity of the typical mortgage loan. Apart 
                                                 
3 The substantial incentives for mortgage payments in the tax regime provide an explanation for the 
extremely high LTV ratios in the Netherlands. (see further discussion of the impact of tax regimes) 
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from the fact that deregulation can take effect only gradually through new contracts, the 
slow changes may be attributed to other factors as well. One explanation may be that the 
significantly different histories of inflation, and thus nominal interest rates, still have an 
impact on household decisions.   
In the following sections, we attempt to highlight the most relevant trends of mortgage 
markets in the last decades and to present the stylised facts illustrating the interplay of 
mortgage markets with other key macroeconomic variables.  
The mortgage debt/GDP ratio has increased substantially during the last 20 years in 
most of the developed countries. Whereas in the early ‘80s, the mortgage debt/GDP 
ratio exceeded 50% in only a few of the countries with the most developed mortgage 
markets (such as Denmark and the UK), by 2001, nearly half of the countries in our 
sample recorded ratios around or above 50%. The average growth rates of mortgage 
debt/GDP ratios have varied through the different periods and also across countries. As 
already mentioned, the most dynamic growth in our sample was that of Portugal during 
the ‘90s, with an average growth of 15% per annum. During this period, Spain also 
recorded an annual growth rate above 10%. For the entire period of 1980-2001, the 
highest growth rate was slightly less, at 10%, also recorded in Portugal. On the other 
hand, there was basically no growth in the mortgage debt/GDP ratio of France during 
the entire period.    
Analysing the dynamics of the mortgage debt/GDP ratios in a macroeconomic context, 
the changes can, to a large extent, be attributed to three major macroeconomic factors: 
changes in real house prices and interest rates, and the deregulation of the mortgage 
markets. 
It is interesting to examine the interrelation between mortgage debt and house price 
growth in different countries (see  Figure 3). The EU countries provide a wide set of 
combinations. In Portugal, for instance, the most dynamic growth of the mortgage 
debt/GDP ratio was not accompanied by any growth in real house prices in the ‘90s.  By 
contrast, in Germany, where the mortgage debt/GDP ratio was already high in the ‘80s, 
real house prices were rather decreasing in the second half of the ‘90s, parallel with a 
mild increase in the mortgage debt/GDP ratio. Italy and the Netherlands show a third 
type of relationship: house prices and mortgages have been positively correlated. In Italy, 
house prices and the mortgage debt/GDP ratio showed a cyclical pattern following the 
economic cycle, the correlation having been broken by the yield convergence prior to the 
euro adoption which resulted in a pronounced growth of the mortgage debt/GDP ratio. 
In the Netherlands, the two indicators were growing basically parallel during the entire 
period, with a faster house price growth at the end of the period.  
Changes in nominal mortgage rates had a clear effect on mortgage dynamics. The 
nominal interest rate of mortgage debt plays a crucial role in determining the credit 
constraint of households in EU countries, as loan indexation had never been popular, for 
historical reasons, in these countries. Mortgage interest rates declined during the ‘90s in 
all countries, reaching historically low levels in a number of countries. The decrease in 
the nominal rates could be attributed partly to cyclical effects, which generated very low 
real interest rates globally from 2002 and, more importantly for a number of countries, to 
a drop in inflation rates and risk premium. The latter was especially significant in the case 
of South European eurozone countries during the nominal convergence process (see 
Figure 4).  
The effect of the change in mortgage interest rates on credit constraints can be best 
illustrated by an example. Using the interest rates prevailing in 1995 and 2002 in different 
countries, given the example of a 20-year loan with fix nominal instalments, where 1/3 of 
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the disposable income is spent on amortisation, we calculated the maximum amount of 
loan a household could take out. The change in the credit constraint, which is the 
difference between the maximum loan amounts in 1995 and 2002, can be expressed in 
terms of monthly income. The following table shows that the easing of the credit 
constraint was significant in all countries, and it had the greatest effect in the case of 
Portugal, Spain and Italy, explaining to a large extent the growth in the mortgage 
debt/GDP ratio. 
Table 2. Effects of decreasing yields between 1995 and 2002 
Country Change in the credit constraint (monthly income) 
Portugal 20.6 
Spain 20.2 
Italy 19.6 
Denmark 10.1  
UK 9.8 
Germany 6.8 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The relevance of the effect of the nominal interest rate on mortgage dynamics can also 
be seen in the debt service of mortgage loans compared to disposable income. As Figure 
5 (ECB 2003) shows,4 despite the more dynamic growth of mortgage debt/GDP ratios, 
the mortgage debt service/disposable income ratio has increased only modestly in most 
countries due to the substantial easing effect of the lower nominal interest rates. As 
regards the effect of decreasing nominal and real interest rates, a BIS study by Debelle 
(2004) came to a similar conclusion based on calculations of the ratio of debt service of 
total household debt to disposable income. 
Thus far, we could, to a large extent, explain the dynamics of mortgage debt/GDP ratios 
in an economic context in recent decades. However, the marked differences in the level 
of mortgage indebtedness across countries suggest that institutional factors also play a 
role.  
Mortgage regulations are basically not yet harmonised in the EU.  There are still barriers 
to further integration, as identified by the Forum Group on Mortgage Credit (2004), and 
the level of cross-border activity is low compared to other segments of the financial 
sector. The regulatory and institutional differences appear to be due to differences in 
characteristics of mortgage regimes; rather surprisingly, these differences are less 
reflected in mortgage interest rates across regimes in the eurozone member countries. 
Due to yield convergence in the second half of the ‘90s (see Figure 6), the standard 
deviation of mortgage rates within the eurozone have dropped significantly and euro 
mortgage rates have recently been very similar across member countries. 
It is worth noting the difference in household preferences between Portugal and Italy. 
While both countries had experienced significant credit constraints prior to eurozone 
membership, and now as euro area members face low and very similar interest rates and 
economic policy frameworks, households in these two countries responded entirely 
differently to the easing of credit constraints.  In contrast to the situation in Portugal, 
families in Italy do not have a strong tendency to rely on the financial system to solve 
                                                 
4 This is only an estimate of the debt-servicing-to-income ratio, particularly as it applies the mortgage 
interest rate of new contracts to the whole stock of mortgage debt 
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housing problems, as indicated by the country’s permanently low mortgage debt/GDP 
ratio. 
House Equity Withdrawal   
House equity withdrawal has become relevant for monetary transmission in a number of 
developed countries in the past decades, parallel with the liberalisation of the mortgage 
markets. There are very different patterns in housing equity withdrawal, both significantly 
positive and negative values can be found in the EU. This might look less than 
straightforward given that housing as an asset has a relatively stable ratio to total 
household wealth in the four biggest EU countries5. On the one hand, house equity 
withdrawal was equal to 3% of disposable income in the UK during the ‘80s and the ‘90s. 
According to the OECD (2004), house equity withdrawal was also positive in the 
Netherlands and was around zero in Denmark in the ‘90s. On the other hand, in 
Germany, Italy and France during the ‘90s, households increased housing wealth on 
average by 6% of disposable income, implying that house equity withdrawal was 
significantly negative.  
The experience of the UK shows that house equity withdrawal became significant after 
the beginning of the liberalisation of the mortgage markets in the early 1980s, rising 
during the entire decade to reach 8% of disposable income by 1989.  Apart from the 
liberalisation of the mortgage markets, the UK experience also supports the concept that 
the number of transactions also plays an important role in house equity withdrawal. In 
the UK, the ratio of transactions to owner-occupied housing is about twice as high as the 
EU average. It is also above average in the Netherlands and Denmark. 
During the cyclical downturn in the past years, house equity withdrawal became an 
important macroeconomic issue in a number of economies. In the US, which can be 
considered as one of the best examples for house equity withdrawal, equity extracted 
from owner-occupied housing reached $700bn, or around 9% of disposable income, in 
2002. A large part of this extraction, almost $200bn, was related to the refinancing of 
existing callable loans. Low and decreasing mortgage rates undoubtedly motivated 
refinancing, particularly given the low cost prepayment options in the US mortgage 
market.   An even greater part of house equity withdrawal, $350bn, was related to the 
transactions of existing homes. It is not surprising, then, that a record number of existing 
home sales, strongly encouraged by the low mortgage rates, was behind the very high 
level of transaction-related house equity withdrawals. According to Fed estimates 
(Greenspan 2003), mortgage originations for existing home purchases reached $600bn, 
after subtracting repayment of home sellers, resulting in a net increase of $350bn in 
mortgage debt, of which a considerable part was spent on goods and services. By and 
large, evidence from the US in the last years illustrate that, provided a sufficiently 
developed and efficient mortgage market exists in the economy, monetary policy through 
housing equity withdrawal can have a greater impact on household behaviour, and thus 
on economic activity, than previously thought.    
 
                                                 
5 The ratio, according to HM Treasury (2003), is between 0,31 (in Italy) and 0,4 (in France), with Germany 
(0,32) and the UK (0,34) in between. In assessing these ratios, it should be kept in mind that the definition 
of households’ total asset cannot  be compared strictly across countries due to, for instance, differences in 
pension schemes and, therefore, the size of pension funds.      
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Transaction costs, tax regimes 
Considering that dwellings answer a basic human need, housing is also an important area 
for economic policy. Governments in most countries take measures to influence the 
housing market, to pursue social goals, such as improving the housing conditions for 
low-income households. Government intervention also has implications for the 
monetary transmission. In the following discussion, which is based on the ECB (2003) 
survey, we focus on the interaction between government policies and monetary 
transmission. 
Government policies pertaining to housing include, on the one hand, subsidies (such as 
provision of tax exemptions for housing-related expenses and direct subsidies to certain 
households) and transaction-related taxes, on the other. Theoretically, government 
measures have an impact on the housing market at three levels of household decision-
making: first, on the choice between investment in housing and moveable assets; second, 
the choice between owner-occupied and rented housing; and finally, the choice between 
new and existing housing.  
Most EU countries have traditionally supported home ownership through direct 
subsidies and the granting of tax exemptions for mortgage interest payments, and by not 
taxing imputed rents. Measures favouring owner occupation can have an adverse effect 
on the single monetary policy, as they decrease labour mobility within the eurozone, an 
important adjustment mechanism in the monetary union. The total amount of public 
expenditures on housing policies in the EU countries has not changed significantly since 
1980, averaging 0.6-1.3% of GDP6. While public expenditures remained generally stable, 
there were important changes in the structure of housing policy measures in most EU 
countries. A number of countries have moved towards a more neutral stance in terms of 
influencing investment decisions between housing and movable assets. At the same time, 
some countries have increased the incentives towards owner-occupied housing. 
Transaction costs do not only generate income for the government in the form of stamp 
and registration duties and inheritance taxes; they also provide a means for containing 
speculative price movements. However, higher transaction costs can also have adverse 
effects. Higher transaction costs tend to decrease the number of transactions in the 
housing market, as shown by EU data. Belgium, which has the highest stamp duties, 
reaching 10-12%, has one of the lowest transaction figures, while the UK with very low 
stamp duties (1-4%) has the highest transaction figures. Relating housing transactions to 
house equity withdrawal, it can be concluded that government policies can constrain 
monetary transmission if these rely heavily on transaction-related incomes. 
III. 2. Housing in the monetary transmission of the EU countries 
Prior to accession to the eurozone, it is important for the conduct of Hungarian 
monetary policy to understand in detail the transmission mechanism in the eurozone. 
Focusing on eurozone experiences is particularly  important in trying to analyse a channel 
that is relatively new to the Hungarian economy, such as the interaction between 
monetary policy and the housing and mortgage markets. Given the nominal convergence 
process of Hungary, the experiences of the less developed eurozone countries can serve 
as useful benchmarks for expected future dynamics, both during the last years of the 
convergence process and for the expected effects in the early years in the eurozone. 
                                                 
6 These figures are not strictly comparable across countries, as some countries include forgone revenues in 
public expenditures, while others do not.  
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Furthermore, understanding the main features of the transmission mechanism in these 
countries could help policymakers to facilitate the convergence of the Hungarian housing 
and mortgage markets to structures prevailing in the eurozone.  
The first characteristic of the transmission mechanism in the eurozone is related to the 
dominance of long-term, non-callable bonds in the mortgage markets of the biggest 
member countries. As discussed previously, the dominance of long non-callable bonds 
results in a rather weak link between the key interest rate and interest burden of the 
mortgage debt in the eurozone, and leads to a slow convergence of the main parameters 
of the existing mortgage stock across the different countries.  
The heterogeneity of the structural factors, along with the differences in house price and 
mortgage dynamics, has important implications for the monetary transmission in the 
eurozone. Prior to the launch of the single currency, some economists had serious 
concerns about the risks stemming from the differences in the transmission mechanism 
between interest rates and housing markets, given the heterogeneity of institutional and 
market characteristics. Maclennan, Muellbaurer and Stephens (1999) argue that, apart 
from initial heterogeneity, there could be considerable blockages to the convergence of 
the mortgage and housing markets in the unified financial markets even in the longer 
run.  These could slow down the process, and probably eliminate the prospect of 
convergence entirely in some countries.  
It is interesting to note in this regard that an assessment of the structural factors in the 
EU housing markets based on the four-year experience of the monetary union (ECB 
2003) highlighted the fact that, due to the liberalisation of the markets, the heterogeneity 
prevailing in the mortgage markets of the eurozone countries had moved from the 
country level to the household level. This implies that the transmission through the 
mortgage and housing markets in the eurozone will retain its heterogeneity in the long 
run.  However, in contrast to the situation before the adoption of the euro, it will change 
from household to household, as households can have access to a wider range of 
mortgage products in choosing what fits their preferences the best.    
The ECB conducted a comprehensive analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism 
in the eurozone (Angeloni et al. 2002), summarising the experiences of the first years of 
the single currency. The analysis took into account the difficulties related to the short 
time series since the implementation of the euro, as well as the structural changes that 
might have happened due to the change in the monetary regimes of the member 
countries. Having these caveats in mind, the study found that the interest rate channel is 
a very important channel of monetary transmission, although it is not exclusive in many 
countries. The bank lending channel was found to be significant in Italy and Germany, 
countries with more rigid mortgage markets, although at the eurozone level, the results 
were contrary to the presumption of a widespread and strong bank lending channel.  
The study also found that the overall effect of monetary policy on the real economy is 
comparable between the US and the eurozone. However, the components of GDP most 
sensitive to monetary policy are different. It is investment that drives output changes in 
the eurozone, whereas in the US, much of the output adjustment seems to stem from 
changes in consumption. These qualitative findings are consistent with the assumption 
that flexible mortgage markets, such as those in the UK and the US, can strengthen the 
monetary transmission mechanism operating through households’ consumption 
behaviour.      
Among the most developed EU mortgage markets, the UK and Denmark are not part of 
the eurozone, as both countries have an opt-out from becoming a full member of the 
EMU. However, both countries have thorough analyses of how their transmission 
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mechanism through the housing and mortgage markets would be affected by the 
adoption of the euro. What makes the comparison of the two countries even more 
interesting is the fact that they are basically at the opposite ends of the spectrum in terms 
of mortgage regimes. 
In the UK, HM Treasury (2003) prepared a study on the implications of the housing 
market for the transmission mechanism as part of the very comprehensive assessment of 
the five economic tests for determining whether adoption of the euro would be in the 
interest of the economy. The study concluded that, due to the structural differences 
between the UK and the eurozone housing and mortgage markets, the interest-rate 
sensitivity of households in the UK is greater than in the eurozone.  Thus, the optimal 
monetary policy for the enlarged eurozone might not be optimal for the UK. The study 
identifies four main structural differences: housing supply elasticity, level of mortgage 
debt combined with the dominance of variable rate mortgages, owner-occupation rate 
and the level of competition and liberalisation of mortgage markets. The last point is the 
main reason behind the difference in house equity withdrawal, which has probably the 
most important macroeconomic effect for the difference between the consumption 
behaviour of UK and eurozone households.  
Denmark has a rather different view of the possible effects of adopting the euro. Despite 
the structural differences between the housing and mortgage markets of Denmark and 
the eurozone countries, there are no serious concerns about the possible effects of 
adopting the euro. One reason for this is the set-up of the current monetary policy 
framework: the Danish crown is pegged to the euro with a narrow band in the ERM II 
regime, and the interest rate policy of the ECB is rather closely followed by the Danish 
National Bank. Due to the monetary regime, the adoption of the euro would mean only 
slightly lower interest rates, given the 20-30 bps spread of Danish yields above euro 
benchmark levels. Based on the fixed exchange rate regime market, participants can 
hedge prepayment risk in the euro market without needing to hedge currency risk, 
although, the single currency could make hedging even easier in the Danish market.  
Another reason behind the pro-euro stance is the limited difference between the 
transmission effects of the long callable Danish bonds and the non-callable eurozone 
bonds in empirical terms. As discussed earlier, an asymmetry arises between callable and 
non-callable types when the long rates are decreasing, making the re-mortgaging of 
callable bonds profitable. This happens usually when the economy is below the potential 
growth rate and the monetary policy stance is accommodative. In these cases the 
asymmetry would lead to faster recovery through the higher consumption generated by 
the more favourable terms of re-mortgaging. However, it would not lead to overheating 
as there are basically no differences between the two mortgage types in times of 
increasing yields, leading to tighter monetary conditions. 
While it is important to pay attention to the national characteristics influencing monetary 
transmission even in a monetary union, global forces should also be kept in mind. An 
IMF study (IMF 2004) argues that house prices are globally synchronised to a large 
extent, despite the extreme non-tradable nature of dwellings. The study, which used the 
dynamic factor model, has found that in a set of 13 developed countries, global factors 
explained, on average, 40% of house price movements between 1980 and 2004. One 
theoretical explanation for the important role of global factors in determining house 
prices is that, apart from housing assets, a significant part of household wealth consists 
of internationally traded assets, causing rates of return to move in a coordinated fashion 
globally. Another reason, confirmed by the econometric results of the IMF (2004), is that 
interest rates and mortgage debt/GDP ratios are correlated with the global housing 
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factor, which captures common shocks affecting house prices in all countries of the 
sample. These results highlight the importance of monetary policy and the mortgage 
market in the housing markets of developed countries, strengthening the transmission 
mechanism of the single monetary policy in the eurozone.     
By and large, there is a sizeable outstanding stock of mortgage loans and the mortgage 
debt/GDP ratio has been growing steadily in the eurozone, not least due to the effects of 
the convergence of nominal yields. However, the transmission effect of residential 
mortgage loans is rather limited, as the bulk of the loans in the biggest countries are 
made up of long, non-callable loans. Mortgage markets are liberalised, as reflected in the 
growing heterogeneity of the new contracts across countries.  However, on an aggregate 
level, the competitiveness of the eurozone mortgage market is well behind that of the 
UK market, where households have a better opportunity for housing equity withdrawal 
and can thus significantly ease credit constraints to smooth consumption.   
 
IV. Short history of the Hungarian housing market 
The Hungarian housing market experienced a number of shocks in the last two decades. 
In the late ‘80s and the early ‘90s, Hungarian households, wary of an economic 
breakdown,  turned to real estate as the most important form of saving.  This resulted in 
rising house prices. A few years into the transition, concerns regarding economic stability 
began to subside, paving the way for the restoration of portfolio balance between real 
and financial saving. This led to the so-called financial savings’ miracle in Hungary in the 
mid-‘90s7. 
At the beginning of the transition in the early 1990s, there was no mortgage market to 
speak of in Hungary. Although there was a considerable amount of outstanding 
subsidised housing loans during the socialist regime, the government decided to abolish 
the subsidy on account of the rising budget deficit, which attended the collapse of the 
centrally planned economy. Following the legal disputes over the termination of the 
subsidy for existing, long-maturity loans, the subsidised housing loans were converted 
into market-rate loans, significantly increasing the debt-servicing obligations of 
households. However, debtors were given the option to repay the debt fully at highly 
advantageous discounted rates. Since many households chose the prepayment option, the 
outstanding amount of housing loans dropped to less than HUF 150 bn by 1991, 
equivalent to 6% of GDP.  It dropped further in nominal terms, becoming insignificant, 
from a macroeconomic point of view, for almost a decade (see Figure 7).    
There were basically no new housing loans during the years when inflation was high and 
volatile. In 1991, the inflation rate peaked at 35%, remaining above 15% until 1998.  In 
light of this, and considering the 1/3 prudential limit on debt service/disposable income, 
households could thus not raise loans exceeding their two-year income8, even with 
nominal interest rates close to 15%. High and volatile rates of inflation in the first half of 
the ‘90s also led to the shortening of business contracts. Economic agents did not want 
to get tied down to long nominal contracts.  This was particularly true in the financial 
markets.  Even the Hungarian government could not issue long-term forint bonds: the 5-
                                                 
7 For a more detailed description of this period see Zsoldos (1997). 
8 Due to the effect of high interest rates on the credit constraint of a household, assuming a 20-year 
maturity and that 1/3 of disposable income is spent on the loan amortisation. 
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year government bond appeared in the market only in 1996. Considering that mortgage 
loans cannot have maturities longer than benchmark government bonds, the short yield 
curve also significantly constrained the potential growth of the mortgage market. In 
short, a confluence of factors hampered the growth of the mortgage market in the first 
years of the transition: high and volatile inflation, as well as low household demand for 
mortgages owing to declining real wages and rising unemployment. 
The next period of development in the Hungarian housing market may be considered to 
have started in the late ‘90s9. Economic consolidation began in the mid ‘90s.  This was 
accompanied by increasing credibility in the stability oriented economic policy.  As a 
result, long yields and the inflation rate declined continuously from 1997, parallel with 
the gradual extension of the benchmark government yield curve to longer maturities of 
10 and 15 years in 1999 and 2001, respectively. These developments created the 
necessary financial background for the functioning of a mortgage market in Hungary.  
Alongside these developments was the establishment of the legal framework for the 
Hungarian mortgage market. In 1997, the Parliament passed the Act on Mortgage 
Institutions. In line with this, new regulations in related areas, such as loan origination, 
foreclosure and prudential limits, were harmonized with the EU legal framework. 
However, despite improving macroeconomic and financial conditions and the institution 
of a legal and regulatory framework, the mortgage market remained stagnant until 2000 
when the government introduced mortgage-related subsidies.  
In 2000, more than 10 years after the loan subsidies were abandoned in the last years of 
the socialist regime, the government introduced interest subsidies to long mortgage loans 
for new housing constructions. The main rationale for instituting the new housing policy 
measures was the fact that the number of new housing constructions had been declining 
throughout the ‘90s. This decline was, to a large extent, due to the lack of house 
financing: households could rely only on their savings to finance housing investment.  
Early governmental measures promoting only new housing constructions facilitated the 
development of a mortgage regime similar to many EU countries, with the dominance of 
fixed non-callable mortgage loans. Although these measures did not have a major 
macroeconomic impact, they gave an impetus to the previously inert mortgage market. In 
2000, the households’ mortgage debt/GDP ratio started to post some growth.  To 
further foster this growth, although to a smaller extent, the government extended the 
subsidy to buying existing dwellings as well. Meanwhile, macroeconomic conditions had 
also become favourable: the inflation rate dropped below the 7% target at end-2001, 
while the yield curve showed a steep negative slope, reflecting investors’ confidence in 
the profitability of the convergence play strategy in the Hungarian government bond 
market. The new government measures, along with the favourable macroeconomic 
conditions, resulted in a gradual increase in mortgage loans, with a monthly average of 
HUF 15 bn of new loans granted in 2001.  However, the outstanding stock by the end of 
the year still did not exceed 2% of GDP.  
The year 2002 brought dramatic changes to the mortgage market. Government subsidies 
directly targeting households were increased significantly at the beginning of the year. 
Moreover, through subsidies linked to funding costs, bank margins climbed to 8%. 
Meanwhile, the subsidy scheme was exhibiting a rather unusual feature: the interest 
burden of households was not sensitive to market rates; all interest rate risk was with the 
central budget. The most general mortgage type was a 15-20 year loan, with the interest 
                                                 
9 The early stage of this period is discussed in Valkovszky (2000). 
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rate fixed for 5 years and a cap on interest paid by households at 6% for existing 
dwellings and even lower for new constructions. These rates were even significantly 
lower than benchmark government yields at that time.  
The subsidy scheme was clearly not going to be sustainable. Under the scheme, even 
households  that would otherwise not have considered taking out a mortgage loan in the 
near future, were applying for loans simply to take advantage of the favourable 
conditions. This resulted in such a sudden and significant rise in mortgage loans that, by 
the middle of 2002, the mortgage market had started to post exponential growth.  In the 
second half of the year, the volume of new loans originated in 2 months exceeded the 
total volume originated in the previous year. However, the government was slow to 
respond.  It decided to cut the subsidies substantially only in December 2003, amidst 
serious concerns about the external and internal stability of the Hungarian economy. 
The tightening measures primarily attempted to cut the budget expenditures on interest 
rate subsidies. Given the lower subsidies for the new loans, banks’ profit margins 
declined, parallel with the significant increase in the interest burden of households. 
Furthermore, the changes to the subsidy scheme gave rise to two new features: mortgage 
rates became partly linked to market rates, and the difference between subsidies for new 
and existing housing widened from 1 to around 3 percentage points. (See Figure 8) 
From the transmission point of view, the most relevant change was the establishment of 
the link between the mortgage rate faced by households and the market rate. The 
immediate and strong impact of the tightening measures on the demand for new loans 
may be attributed not only to the fact that subsidies were cut significantly but also to 
unfavourable market developments. As concerns about the external and internal 
equilibrium of the Hungarian economy increased in 2003, the long segment of the yield 
curve started to increase significantly, putting an end to the yield convergence that 
characterised long yields in the previous years.  
Loan origination dropped significantly in 2004 as a natural consequence of the tightening 
measures and the high long rates. At the same time, a new product appeared in the 
market: foreign exchange-denominated (FX) mortgage. Faced with the high forint (HUF) 
mortgage rate, a growing number of households opted for mortgages with a lower 
nominal rate, notwithstanding the imminent exchange rate risk.  
V. Hungarian housing market in monetary transmission   
In this section, we apply econometric techniques to estimate the role of housing and 
mortgage markets in monetary transmission in Hungary. Apart from the standard 
transmission channels (namely, the interest rate channel and, the joint wealth effect-credit 
channel), we identified two other effects which influence the role of the Hungarian 
housing market in monetary transmission. Looking ahead, the expected effects of the 
single monetary policy of the eurozone on the Hungarian markets are also discussed. 
V. 1. Interest rate channel 
We expect mortgage loans to have a weak direct impact on households’ disposable 
income in Hungary, for two reasons. First, despite dynamic growth in recent years, the 
outstanding stock of mortgage loans is still low compared to that in developed countries. 
Second, the key interest rate affecting the yield curve has had only a minor impact on the 
interest burden of mortgage loans due to the features of the government subsidies 
effective until 2003. Apart from the government subsidies, the fixed non-callable 
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mortgages dominating the Hungarian market result in a delayed effect of interest rate 
changes, similar to many eurozone countries.   
Based on the evolution of the mortgage market and the government subsidy scheme 
discussed in Section II, the following table summarises the direct effect of interest 
expenditure on disposable income and the effect of a change in the market interest rate. 
Table 3. Sensitivity of disposable income to changes in the mortgage interest rate 
Year 
Households’ 
disposable income 
(bn HUF) 
Mortgage interest 
expenditure 
(bn HUF) 
Interest payments/
Disposable income
(%) 
Sensitivity of interest 
expenditures to change 
(+100 bps) of the market 
rate (bn HUF) 
2001 8913 18.4 0.21% 0.8 
2002 9742 53.4 0.55% 2.2 
2003 10863 95.4 0.88% 3.9 
2004* 11950 132.2 1.11% 5.5 
* Estimate.  
Source: Own calculations 
 
As is apparent from Table 3, a one-percentage-point change in the market rate induces a 
negligible change in the disposable income of the household sector and, thus, in 
aggregate consumption expenditure.  
 
V. 2. Wealth effect and credit channel 
In order to determine the wealth effect of monetary policy on housing investment and 
private consumption, we first have to estimate the relationship between the interest rate 
and house prices. Using the resulting price elasticity coefficient, we can then simulate the 
following: (1) the effect of interest rates on house prices, and thus on dwelling 
investment, and (2) the effect of altered housing wealth on consumption. 
As previously discussed, house prices can be modelled within an error correction 
framework. Previous studies used simple time-series techniques.  However, due to the 
short sample period, this is not feasible for Hungary. Instead of using aggregated time 
series we apply panel data where the cross-sectional variance comes from the geographic 
separation10. The economic rationale for using national cross-sectional data lies in the 
fact that the mobility of Hungarian households between regions is very low.  Thus, 
regional time series are not explanatory variables for each other. 
A further adjustment to equation (2) is the exclusion of demographic variables. 
Demographic variables are certainly essential to explaining house prices when significant 
demographic fluctuations can be observed. However, our sample is too short (quarterly 
observations for the period of 1997-2002) to demonstrate such effects. Moreover, we 
also know that there has been no considerable movement in Hungarian demography in 
the past few years. As a result, we can proceed with our estimation process using the 
following equation: 
 
                                                 
10 For details about the data set, see VIII. 1,  section. Data set
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where i represents the capital and the 19 counties of Hungary, while  p, y, r and d00 denote 
house prices, GDP per capita, the interest rate of housing loan, and a dummy variable 
which equals 0 before 2000 and 1 otherwise, respectively. The dummy variable is 
supposed to test whether government measures easing access to mortgage loan has an 
effect on monetary transmission11. Equation (5) can be rewritten in the following form, 
which is a frequently used form of the ECM: 
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where 1210 −+= γγθ , )1()( 21101 −++−= γγββθ , )1()( 21102 −++−= γγααθ  
and )121 −+()( 323 +−= γγααθ . This specification allows us to test numerous 
assumptions, among them: that the ratio of house price to income is constant (θ1=1); 
that the interest rate has a significant effect on house prices (θ2≠0); that government 
measures altered the transmission (θ3≠0); that house price growth has been sluggish 
(γ2≠0), etc. In order to avoid the estimation bias that may arise from using a single 
estimator, we apply three different approaches. 
Firstly, since our sample has a cross-sectional dimension, we apply panel estimators. We 
apply a fixed-effect estimator as a starting point since the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term, making the estimation biased. To handle this problem, we 
apply the IV (instrumental variables) of the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel 
estimator. 
Secondly, panel estimators can have two weaknesses in our case. On the one hand, they 
are appropriate when , so they are not fully suitable to our sample. On the other 
hand, they assume all parameters to be homogeneous in a cross-sectional dimension. 
However, if this assumption does not hold, the following would be the more appropriate 
equation: 
∞→N
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Time-series estimators, such as 3SLS, can handle the second problem. However, they are 
appropriate only when T .  ∞→
In order to handle these weaknesses, we consider a ‘mid-solution’ when the cross-
sectional and time dimensions are roughly equal and allow heterogeneous parameters. 
Pesaran at al. (1999) suggest an estimator for this special case, which is called the pooled 
mean group estimator (PMGE). To ease comparison, we also apply the simple mean 
group estimator (MGE). Finally, for the sake of completeness, we also employ three-
                                                 
11 Since government actions take place in stages, no single date can be pinpointed. As we argued earlier, 
2000 was the first year when subsidy measures were introduced.  It was thus only after that when 
households’ mortgage debt/GDP ratio started growing.  
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stage least squares (3SLS), which is frequently used in time-series studies, keeping in 
mind its aforementioned weakness. 
In order to understand the estimation results, one has to recall the significant discrepancy 
between estimators. While panel estimators use equation (5) and assume all parameters - 
namely, that all α, β and γ are equal across counties - the pooled mean group estimator 
uses equation (7) and restricts only long-run parameters (θs) to be equal, allowing 
different short-run dynamics, i.e., α0, α2, β0 and γ2. Since the latter assumption is more 
acceptable, we design the 3SLS estimation in the same way.   The estimated parameters 
using the various estimation methods are shown in Table 4 below. 
Table 4 Estimation results 
 Fixed effect Arellano-Bond  MGE PMGE  3SLS 
 Coef. t stat Coef. Z stat  Coef. χ2 stat Coef. t stat  Coef. P(θi=0)
γ1 1.330 34.3 0.820 4.02 θ0 -0.255 203.2 -0.068 -1.06  -0.153 0.00 
γ2 -0.502 -14.3 -0.293 -2.47 θ1 0.977 102.2 0.972 10.06  1.065 0.00 
β0 0.441 2.7 0.860 3.85 θ2 -0.031 71.6 -0.028 -9.38  -0.031 0.00 
β1 -0.323 -2.1 -0.403 -1.76 θ3 0.013 190.4 0.010 6.73  0.004 1.00 
α0 -0.002 -0.9 -0.003 -1.07         
α1 -0.005 -2.3 -0.007 -2.71         
α2 0.006 9.2 0.006 7.12         
α3 -0.004 -5.8 -0.002 -1.56         
 Long-run income elasticity 
θ1 0.69 0.966  0.977 0.972  1.065 
P(θ1) = 1 0.165 0.787  0.263 0.775  0.317 
 Long-run interest rate elasticity: 
before 2000 -0.037 -0.020 -0.031 -0.028  -0.031 
after 2000 -0.027 -0.012 -0.019 -0.018  -0.027 
In the case of Arellano-Bond, the Hansen J statistic is χ2(4)= 4.41, P = 0.353, while AR(2) test is z =   1.37, 
P =  0.171. Exogenous instrument variables are pi,t-3, pi,t-4, yi,t-2, shi,t-1, shi,t-2 and fhi,t-2 where sh and fh denote 
new house stars and finished house constructions. In the case of 3SLS, we applied the Monte Carlo 
method to obtain proper distribution. 
 
According to the estimation results, the long-run relationship between house price, 
income and interest rate seems to be an acceptable assumption12. Every estimator 
indicates unit elasticity between house price and income, i.e., the ratio of house price to 
income is constant. The only discrepancy between the panel estimator and the other two 
estimators is the speed of adjustment. While it is reasonable in the case of 3SLS and 
Pesaran-Shin-Smith, the Arellano and Bond estimator indicates too rapid an adjustment 
(θ0 = -0.473). 
The interest rate elasticities before 2000 seem to be reasonable and are also close to each 
other. More worthy of note, however, are the results from the dummy variable 
estimations. Contrary to our expectations, the increasing interest rate elasticity after the 
introduction of government subsidies is not supported by the estimation results. Each of 
the methods implies a declining interest rate parameter, although its magnitude is fairly 
                                                 
12  displays the ratio of price per square meter to monthly per captia GDP in the individual 
counties.  
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small. On the other hand, it is not significant in every estimator, e.g. 3SLS strongly rejects 
the change in the interest rate parameter.  
There could be several reasons for obtaining such a result. Firstly, government subsidies 
were gradually increasing. They can thus be considered as being a series of measures 
rather than one single measure. Due to the relatively short sample period, we did not 
want to extend the number of dummy variables, as this would have distorted the 
estimation results. Instead, we chose the approximate start of the effect of government 
actions (see footnote 11). Secondly, the drop in the mortgage loan rate occurred at the 
end of the sample. Obviously, the adjustment of house prices takes longer, likely 
continuing through the ensuing years. Since the full effect of the sharp decrease in 
interest rate cannot be detected in the sample,  the estimations cannot capture its effect 
properly. Finally, and most importantly, the changing variables do not imply different 
deep parameters. Note that the lower interest rates do not alter household behaviour by 
themselves. They simply increase the demand for credit.  By and large, we believe that 
the whole sample should be considered, although greater attention should be paid to the 
more significant parameters. 
Based on the estimation results, we are able to simulate the effect of the interest rate on 
relevant household variables, such as housing investment and consumption expenditure. 
We use, for the simulation, the Hungarian Quarterly Projection Model (MNB (2004a)) in 
which the consumption function contains housing wealth, and the housing investment 
function is based on the aforementioned portfolio choice approach, and we extended the 
model with our new house price equations. In order to obtain a complete interval, we use 
the lowest (Arellano-Bond) and the highest (3SLS) estimation results. It should be 
recalled, however, that the most probable outcome is likely to be within this interval, as 
the more appropriate Pesaran-Shin-Smith estimator suggests.  
 
Table 5 Transmission through the wealth and credit channel 
 House prices Housing investment  Consumption 
long-run interest 
rate elasticity of 
house price 
-0.012 -0.031 -0.012 -0.031 -0.012 -0.031 
  min max min max min max 
1st year average -0.60 -1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
2nd year average -1.22 -2.89 -0.39 -0.56 -0.05 -0.11 
3rd year average -1.19 -3.07 -0.70 -1.13 -0.11 -0.26 
4th year average -1.19 -3.05 -0.70 -1.02 -0.14 -0.34 
5th year average -1.19 -3.05 -0.69 -0.88 -0.13 -0.35 
* 1 percentage-point permanent increase in mortgage loan rate. Results are displayed as the percentage 
differences from baseline. 
 
Table 5 shows the simulation results of a one percentage-point permanent increase in the 
mortgage loan rate. Evidently, house prices decrease by 1.2 and 3.1 percentage points.  
Declining house prices are only one source of decreasing housing wealth. Higher interest 
rates and lower house prices also discourage housing investment. According to the 
simulation, this effect could be around 1 percent. Lower house prices and dwelling 
investment alter the real wealth position of households, which should influence 
consumption decisions. Since a consumer loan secured by dwellings is not very common 
 21
in Hungary, it is not surprising that declining housing wealth has a rather moderate effect 
on consumption. It should be noted that the changes in consumption expenditure shown 
above stem merely from the housing market; we ignore any other relationship between 
interest rate and consumption. 
V. 3. Country specific features  
Institutional arbitrage – a form of house equity withdrawal 
In recent years, house equity withdrawal has become an important macroeconomic 
feature, despite the unsophisticated mortgage products offered in the Hungarian market. 
The main reason for this was the combination of the previously binding credit constraint 
on households and the generous subsidies made available for existing dwellings.  
The existence of the housing equity withdrawal involving housing transactions can be 
illustrated with an example. Households who would like to purchase a more expensive 
apartment sell their old one and take out a mortgage loan with the highly advantageous 
interest rates. On the aggregate level, if the transaction involves only existing dwellings, 
there is no change in the net financial position of the household sector, as the mortgage 
loan equals the increase in the savings of the seller. However, due to the low interest rate, 
the household taking up the mortgage might consider taking out a bigger loan to finance 
consumption, for instance, to furnish the new apartment. If LTV and debt 
service/income ratios are at manageable levels, households could significantly ease the 
credit constraint. Our previous calculations (MNB Inflation report 2004 February, 
MNB(2004b)) showed that 15-30% of mortgage loans raised for existing housing could 
finance consumption during 2001-2003. The estimation was based on the unexplained 
consumption growth by standard factors such as income, financial and housing wealth, 
and the consumer confidence index13. 
However, the 15-30% ratio of extra consumption expenditure to housing loan was 
plausible in extraordinary years, such as 2002-2003, it is definitely too large in a normal 
housing market after the tightening of the subsidies. In order to test the impact of the 
institutional arbitrage we apply a simple VAR analysis using ∆ln of consumption, 
personal disposable income, financial asset, consumption loan and housing loan. 
According to the estimation results the housing loan had a significant influence on 
consumption expenditure after 2002 (see ). After reaching its peak, this effect 
basically decreased gradually. The econometric results are also consistent with the fact 
that during 2002-2003 the growth rate of consumption loans was subdued temporarily, 
while consumption expenditures remained robust. 
Figure 9
Based on these results, the institutional arbitrage was a significant phenomenon in the 
last years, however, due to the tightening of the government subsidy, its importance will 
decrease in the coming years.  
FX mortgages 
Another distinctive feature of the Hungarian mortgage market is the growing importance 
of FX loans, as discussed in detail in Bethlendi at. al. (2005). Due to the high domestic 
interest rates, FX mortgages are becoming more popular, creating a new and rather 
unique channel for monetary transmission. First, in this case, monetary tightening occurs 
                                                 
13 Widely used empirical consumption functions, such as equation , are not capable of handling the 
changing expectation of households. Several studies suggest the incorporation of consumer confidence 
index into the consumption function, as a possible way to tackle the problem of unobserved factor. See 
Carroll at al (1994), Carnazza and Parigi (2001) and Vadas (2001). 
(4)
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when the exchange rate is depreciating, as household income after mortgage payments 
falls; the converse is true when the exchange rate is appreciating. Another very important 
feature of this channel of monetary transmission is the speed of adjustment: monthly 
instalments are immediately affected by changes in the exchange rate regardless of the 
interest conditions (variable or fixed) of the mortgage loan. 
V. 4. Rental market 
The rental market can have important implications for monetary transmission. Rental 
costs are usually included in the consumer basket.  The housing market therefore has a 
direct effect on inflation. The Hungarian situation is rather special in this regard since 
there are hardly any apartments rented at market price, as reflected in the very high level 
(92%) of owner occupation. One reason behind the very high level of owner occupation 
is the fact that the majority of state-owned apartments were sold to tenants in the early 
‘90s for a symbolic amount. Another possible reason why official statistics register a very 
small renting market is tax evasion. Landlords are obliged to pay a 20% tax after rental 
income. According to anecdotal evidence, however, rental income hardly ever appears in 
the tax reports.  
The non-existence of a statistically observable renting market has led to a situation where 
rental costs are substituted with different items in the Hungarian consumer basket. 
Market rents are substituted with a regulated price, the rents charged by local 
municipalities on dominantly social housing. The imputed rents of owner-occupied 
housing are approximated by a weighted average of goods and services related to house 
repair and maintenance. From a monetary policy point of view this substitution is rather 
controversial, as largely different macroeconomic factors determine regulated prices, 
housing repair and maintenance goods and services on the one hand, and house-price-
linked rental costs on the other.  Thus, the full effect of transmission cannot yet be 
captured by recent statistics.  A switch to actual rental costs in the consumer basket is 
therefore necessary to reflect the real transmission effects.  
Another important point to consider is the difference between the weight of rents in the 
Hungarian and the HICP baskets:  while the weight of housing rents is around 6% in the 
HICP excluding imputed rents, in Hungary, the regulated rent  and the imputed rent 
account for 0.1% and 5.5%, respectively, of the consumer basket.     
V. 5. On the way to the eurozone  
In light of the international experiences discussed in section III, it is important to 
consider the possible dynamics coming into play in the Hungarian housing and mortgage 
market in the coming years and decades. In the following section, we focus mainly on the 
mortgage market for two reasons. First, the most rapid change in the structural factors is 
related to the mortgage market. Second, the adoption of the euro will certainly exert the 
most direct impact through mortgage loans. 
As we look forward to the adoption of the euro, it is logical to assess the future of the 
Hungarian mortgage market in light of the experiences of current eurozone members. 
We have seen earlier that Portugal and Italy are the two extremes in terms of mortgage 
market developments. Portugal is the typical example of a credit-constrained market 
where demand for mortgage loans grew extremely fast, alongside interest rate 
convergence. In Italy, on the other hand, there was a rather moderate increase in demand 
during the years of convergence.  
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However, apart from the foregoing, another factor should be considered in studying a 
small open economy using its national currency, such as Hungary. Since a significant part 
of the transmission mechanism through the housing market is related to the 
indebtedness of the household sector, the net financing position of the household sector 
also needs to be taken into account. In other words, apart from structural features, the 
sustainability of the net position of the domestic sectors, as reflected in the current 
account, can also influence the speed of adjustment in the run-up to euro adoption. 
If there were only forint loans available in the mortgage market, the dynamics of the new 
loan provision would depend primarily on long-yield convergence. Given the loan 
conditions after the tightening of the subsidy scheme, the benchmark rates should drop 
some 300-400 basis points, so as to be comparable with the levels during the heavily 
subsidised period of 2002-2003. This would also imply that, due to the gradual process of 
yield convergence, the growth in the mortgage market would be rather limited in the 
coming years, contrary to the exponential dynamics in 2003. In this scenario, the 
Hungarian mortgage market would become similar through time to those in most 
continental EU countries. Given the dominance of long fixed loans in these countries, 
monetary policy has had only a weak impact on the disposable income of households, 
although there is still a substantial growth in the mortgage debt/GDP ratio. 
The response of the household sector to the tightening of the subsidies points, however, 
to a somewhat different path. As earlier mentioned, FX loans became increasingly 
popular in 2004 among households facing the higher forint mortgage rates. The strong 
mortgage demand suggests that Hungarian households were willing to pay a high price, 
namely the imminent exchange risk, to loosen credit constraint. The growing popularity 
of FX mortgage loans provides an additional transmission channel on the one hand, as 
high domestic rates rather shift mortgage demand to FX loans, and leads to the build up 
of the non-hedged FX position of households, raising stability-related concerns, on the 
other.  
Looking from a longer perspective, however, the increased importance of FX loans in 
the mortgage market is only temporary. As earlier noted, the rationale for the FX loans 
from a household’s perspective, lies mainly in the high domestic rates at long maturities, 
which are directly related to macroeconomic fundamentals. Given the still existing 
government subsidies for housing loans, the mechanism by which a credible convergence 
path can decrease the popularity of FX loans is clear: improving fundamentals are 
reflected in decreasing risk premium, leading to lower domestic yields, thus giving less 
incentive for FX loans. At the same time, it is less than straightforward to determine the 
level to which the stock of FX loans will rise before domestic yields become once again 
more favourable to households. It will depend partly on domestic economic policy, when 
it can commit itself to a credible convergence path and also on international market 
conditions, which, due to the historically low short interest rates and rather steep yield 
curve, recently make variable rate FX mortgages highly attractive for credit-constrained 
households.   
Short term simulation 
In light of recent dynamics, it is a relevant question for monetary policy to see what 
could potentially be the size and composition of mortgage loans at the time of eurozone 
accession. To answer this question we performed a simple simulation until 2010, the 
official target date for Hungary’s eurozone accession. 
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The calculations were based on the assumption that mortgage/GDP ratio will be 
growing by 1 percentage point every year until 2010, a rate similar to the dynamics 
observed in 200414. We considered two scenarios for the currency composition of new 
loan origination: in the first case (A), the ratio, of HUF and FX mortgages will be 
constant at 50:50 per cent until 2010, while in the second case (B), due to the fast 
convergence of long HUF yields, the ratio of FX mortgages is decreasing gradually. The 
following table contains the results. 
 
Tabel 8: Currency composition of mortgage loans as a percentage of GDP 
 HUF FX Total 
Transaction in 2004 app. 0.4 0.6 app. 1.0 
Stock in 2004 8.8 0.7 9.5 
Stock in 2010 A 11.8 3.7 
Stock in 2010 B 13.3 2.2 
15.5 
 
The results indicate that the weight of FX loans in total mortgages could be between 15-
25% in 2010, while the level of mortgage indebtedness, in this simplified simulation, is 
not influenced by the currency substitution. It is important to note that the currency 
composition of the loan portfolio also has a significant implication for the ratio of fixed 
and variable interest rates. Contrary to the negative slope of the HUF yield curve, 
explained by the convergence process, both euro and Swiss franc yield curves have a 
positive slope. Credit constrained households, to optimise in this environment, choose 
between short FX interest rates and long HUF rates, therefore the HUF rates are fixed 
for a longer period (1-5 years), while the FX mortgages can be considered as variable rate 
loans. This implies that the Hungarian mortgage market will also become more 
heterogeneous, with an increasing share of variable mortgage products, while the clear 
dominance of fixed non-callable loans will remain.   
Long term outlook 
Although it is still quite early, just a few years after the start of mortgage lending, to 
forecast the mortgage/GDP level which could be considered as the long-run equilibrium 
for Hungary after euro adoption, the popularity of FX loans points toward high 
equilibrium mortgage levels. Considering that Hungarian households have gotten so 
easily used to the wide range of mortgage products, encouraging them to take on 
significant exchange rate risk to improve access to mortgage loans, Hungary will likely 
not follow the moderate path observed in Italy. Rather, mortgage developments in 
Hungary will, more likely, mirror the dynamics observed in Portugal, where mortgage 
loans rose to almost 50% of GDP in the last ten years from a low level comparable to 
Italy.  
                                                 
14 The full year growth in 2004 was significantly influenced by the tightening measures at end-2003. The 
majority of the loans that households applied for in the last weeks of the heavily subsidises were technically 
granted in 2004, thus the first quarter growth reflected dominantly 2003 processes.  
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VI. Conclusions  
Based on the international experiences and the evolution of the Hungarian mortgage and 
housing markets, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
• The transmission through the interest rate channel is negligible at the 
macroeconomic level, for two major reasons. First, notwithstanding its 
exponential growth in the last years, the ratio of mortgage indebtedness to GDP 
in Hungary (10%) is still low compared to those in developed countries (40-
60%). Second, the Hungarian mortgage market is dominated by long, non-
callable loans, which creates a weak and delayed link between key policy interest 
rate and mortgage rates.  
• The wealth and credit channel could be discerned in the Hungarian data, with 
theoretically consistent parameters, although transmission effects on house 
prices, housing investment and consumption are rather limited.  
• A further transmission channel related to house equity withdrawal, the 
institutional arbitrage, due to the very generous subsidy scheme, has had a 
significant impact on household consumption in recent years.  
 
There are various factors determining the future dynamics of mortgage markets until and 
after the adoption of the euro. During the convergence process, the sustainability of the 
net saving position of the domestic sectors can constrain the growth of household 
indebtedness. Recent experience shows that high domestic mortgage rates shift demand 
towards FX loans, rather than decrease the overall demand for mortgages.  
It could take decades after euro adoption to reach the equilibrium mortgage debt/GDP 
level. Given the fast growing loan demand of households, particularly the popularity of 
FX loans at times when domestic rates are high, the possible dynamics in the Hungarian 
market on the longer run, fuelled by the rate convergence and euro adoption, might 
mirror those of Portugal. In Portugal during the last years of the run-up to the eurozone 
and after the euro adoption, in a period of less than 10 years the mortgage debt/GDP 
ratio increased from 10% to almost 50%. 
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VIII. Appendix 
VIII. 1. Data set 
House prices: Data on house prices constitute the most problematic data set. The 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO) publishes house prices based on contracts 
submitted to the Land Registry Office. On one hand, this implies great cross-sectional 
detail. However, CSO data are available only on a yearly basis. In order to increase the 
information content, we thus generated a quarterly database based on the raw monthly 
database of the Hungarian CSO (2003). During the generation process, we applied the 
following data-check filters: 
− the total area of dwellings should be between 20 and 600 m2 square meter 
− the price per square meter of  dwellings should be between € 200 and 4000.  
Income.  Theoretically, the appropriate income variable should be the disposable income 
of households, which would consist of average net wages. However, average net wages 
available at the county level have two problems. First, average wages are only roughly 
half of households’ disposable income. Second, the wage data are published in terms of 
headquarters rather than the actual working site. This means that part of the income 
reported under a certain county may not really be attributable to that county, as it may 
lodge merely the headquarters and not the actual place of work of the employee 
concerned. However, considering that GDP figures are also published in terms of 
headquarters, the available data may still serve as a proxy for  the entire amount of 
households’ incomes. It is thus reasonable to use data on GDP per capita instead of 
average wages. 
Interest rate: We use a composite mortgage interest rate of subsidised loans, market loans 
and FX loans, weighted by their respective shares in loan origination. Since official 
interest rate statistics incorporate data on government subsidies in the time series, we 
therefore used the maximum APRC set by government regulations in case of subsidised 
loans.    
New house starts and finished house constructions: We use new house starts and finished house 
construction by county as exogenous instruments. The first one denotes the number of 
house building permits issued by local governments. The latter shows the number of 
permits to reside that are granted to newly built houses.  
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VIII. 2. Figures 
 
Figure 1. Credit constraint and nominal interest rate 
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Figure 2. Role of mortgages in indebtedness 
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Figure 3. Real house prices and mortgage/GDP growth in selected eurozone countries (1995=100) 
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Figure 4.   Convergence of mortgage interest rates (%) 
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Figure 5. Debt servicing to disposable income (1995=100) 
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Figure 6.  Standard deviation of mortgage rates in eurozone member states 
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Figure 7. Mortgage/GDP in Hungary 
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Figure 8. Effective mortgage interest rate in Hungary  
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Figure 9 Parameter of housing loan in VAR model 
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Figure 10 The ratio of price per square meter to monthly GDP per captia15 
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15 Since both house prices and per capita income could vary county by county the ratio of house price to 
per capita income indicates only the relative price of dwellings. 
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0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Komárom-Esztergom 
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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Nógrád 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Pest 
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Somogy 
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Tolna 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Vas 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Veszprém 
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Zala 
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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